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Abstract
The post-1980s changes in the global higher education landscape have triggered a burgeoning
of incidents of academic corruption in higher education institutions. Since 2000, the discourse on
how to combat academic corruption has gained traction in higher education and quality assurance
is advanced as one of the strategies for fighting corruption in higher education. In 2016, the United
Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (and the Council for Higher Education
Accreditation) issued a “wakeup call” to quality assurance systems to take up a leading role in the
battle against academic corruption in view of the massive societal risks associated with the vice.
However, there is a dearth of empirical and conceptual studies on how the quality assurance
systems, in general, and external quality assurance systems, in particular, can take up a leading
role in the crusade against academic corruption. This conceptual article, using the crime–
punishment model as an analytical lens, discusses how the national quality assurance agencies
(and systems) can exercise the leadership role in combating academic corruption. The article
advances the setting of academic integrity standards, institutional and program accreditation,
accreditation of academic journals, sharing information and promoting whistleblowing, monitoring
of institutions, applying sanctions, and ranking of higher education institutions on the basis of
integrity indicators as options that are available to quality assurance agencies to exercise their
leadership role in combating academic corruption. These approaches are likely to create both
incentives and disincentives for the higher education institutions and staff in connection with
engaging in academic corruption. Nevertheless, the article takes cognizance of the idea that
external quality assurance is necessary but not sufficient in combating corruption at the academy
level.
Keywords: academic corruption, combating, higher education, quality assurance
Introduction
Academic corruption—or corruption in higher education—is a global phenomenon that is
not new in higher education (Chapman & Lindner, 2016; Mohamedbhai, 2016, 2017; Osipian,
2008; van’t Land, 2017). What appears to be new in the higher education landscape is the post1990 global attention that has been directed at the vice (Heyneman, 2013) and the transnational
ramifications associated with it (Denisova-Schmidt, 2018). This assertion does not infer that the
lower subsectors of the education system are islands of integrity, but it does suggest that higher
education is more at risk of academic corruption than primary and secondary education. The
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susceptibility of higher education to academic corruption is explicated by, inter alia, the enormous
benefits that accrue to the individuals from higher education and the stigma associated with failure
to obtain a credential from a higher education institution (Chapman & Lindner, 2016; Hallak &
Poisson, 2007a). In the 21st century, postsecondary education is perceived as a means to an
end. Specifically, higher education is responsible for the “distribution of life chances and privileged
access to the labour market” (Martin, 2016, p. 49; Martin & Poisson, 2015, p. 1); acts as a stepping
stone to most positions of power, authority, and prestige in most societies (Hallak & Poisson,
2007a); and bolsters salary prospects (Martin, 2016). The post-1980s debate on whether higher
education is a public or private good lends credence to the view that higher education pays
dividends to individuals, the ripple effect on society notwithstanding.
The burgeoning incidents of academic corruption have not taken place in a vacuum.
Arguably, a plethora of post-1980s trends in higher education have amplified the opportunities for
academic corruption. These shifts in the higher education landscape include, but are not limited
to, the emergence of open and distance learning institutions, the growth in the private provision
of higher education, the deregulation of higher education, the growth of transnational higher
education, increased competition among students and institutions, and the emergence of private
accreditation agencies at international level (Martin, 2016; Pollak & Poisson, 2007a; Stensaker,
2013). Academic corruption at the level of the academy occurs and is often reported in teaching,
student admission and recruitment, student assessment credentials and qualifications, and
research and publication of theses and dissertations (Chapman & Lindner, 2016; Hallak &
Poisson, 2007b; Mohamedbhai, 2016; O’Malley, 2018). The various internal stakeholders in
higher education institutions—administrators, academics, and students—are both potential
perpetrators of and allies in the crusade against academic corruption. From the angle of
sustaining the vice, administrators at the various levels of the academy may be inclined to engage
in the following corrupt practices: changing students’ grades for money or favors, basing
promotions on inappropriate criteria, running sham journals, displaying nepotism or favoritism,
awarding degrees in return for favors, running or collaborating in operating degree mills, and
awarding sham degrees (Chapman & Lindner, 2016). Conversely, academics may be inclined to
engage in unethical practices such as selling admissions, falsifying data, plagiarizing, gift
authoring, and ghost authoring. The student community could be involved in paying for or giving
incentives for admission, obtaining advance copies of tests and examinations, plagiarizing, and
cheating.
Despite this discourse, there is lack of consensus on what constitutes corruption, generally
(and academic corruption, in particular), due to variations in cultural norms across different
countries and regions. What may be considered corruption in a particular context may be an
acceptable practice in another (Eaton, 2016). In some cultural contexts, the common corrupt
practices at the level of the academy (and in higher education systems) are viewed as
“unfortunate but necessary” (Eaton, 2018, p. 9). This suggests that a one-size-fits-all approach to
combating academic corruption may be counterproductive. In other words, the corruption
containment strategies ought to be context sensitive. It should be noted that the practices that
have been highlighted here and in which the stakeholders in higher education engage are
regarded as corruption in the African higher education landscape.
Academic corruption has attracted considerable concern among the stakeholders in
higher education (Chapman & Lindner, 2016). The concern stems from the realization that the
vice intensifies inequities (Osipian, 2008) and threatens the “reputation of research products and
graduates of the institutions” (Heyneman, 2013, p. 101) regardless of their guilt or innocence as
well as the “credibility, effectiveness and quality of higher education” (United Nations Educational,
Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] and Council for Higher Education Accreditation
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[CHEA], 2016, p. 9). Furthermore, academic corruption erodes the trust of the employers and the
general public in the country’s higher education system, prepares underqualified professionals,
teaches distorted values and culture (Rumyantseva, 2005), and undermines the cherished value
of higher education (Vincent-Lancrin, 2013). Finally, corruption inadvertently sends a message,
replete with danger, to the students that “personal success comes, not through merit and hard
work, but through favoritism, bribery and fraud” (Chapman & Lindner, 2016, p. 248).
Corruption in higher education is a new field of research. The extant studies on the subject
focus on the definitions and nature of academic corruption (Hallak & Poisson, 2007b; Heyneman,
2004 Osipian, 2007), the opportunities for academic dishonesty (Hallak & Poisson, 2007a) and
the costs associated with corruption. Since 2000, empirical studies that focus on academic
corruption containment approaches have burgeoned (e.g. Hallak & Poisson, 2007b; Heyneman,
2004). However, within the discourse on combating academic corruption, there has been “little
attention to whether QA [quality assurance] can play a role in preventing corruption” (CHEA, 2016,
p. 3) despite its high potential to prevent and detect the vice (Heyneman, 2013; Martin, 2016;
Martin & Poisson, 2015). Together with CHEA, UNESCO—in a 2016 advisory statement—issued
a “wakeup call” to the sector’s quality assurance systems to take up a leading role in the battle
against academic corruption (UNESCO & CHEA, 2016). The advisory statement has received
accolades within the higher education community for “providing an opportunity to move forward
and to engage this important topic” (Eaton, 2018, p. 8). Nevertheless, there is a dearth of empirical
and conceptual studies on how external quality assurance systems can take up a leading role in
the antiacademic corruption battle.
It is against this backdrop that this conceptual article, in a bid to add to the debate on the
contribution of external quality assurance to tackling academic corruption, provides reflections on
the academic corruption containment strategies at the disposal of higher education quality
assurance agencies. The next section delves into the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings
of the article and is followed by an exposition of the possible strategies for tackling academic
corruption.
Conceptual and Theoretical Perspectives
Most publications on corruption in general (and academic corruption, in particular) have
adopted either the World Bank’s or Transparency International’s definition of corruption. The
World Bank defined corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gain” (as cited in Wei,
1999, p. 2), whereas Transparency International (2018) regarded it as “the abuse of entrusted
power for private gain” (para. 1). Whether, beyond the semantics, the two definitions are
fundamentally different or are different sides of the same coin is debatable. The recurrent question
in the discourse relates to whether the World Bank’s definition, owing to the use of the words
public office, is applicable to both the public and private spheres in general and public and private
higher education in particular. To Denisova-Schmidt (2018), if education is understood to be a
public good, then the World Bank’s conceptualization of corruption is applicable to both public
and private higher education. However, there is no consensus on whether education (specifically,
higher education) is a public or private good. Beyond this treatise, Hallak and Poisson (2002)
defined corruption in education as “the systematic use of public office for private benefit, whose
impact is significant on the availability and quality of educational goods and services, and, as a
consequence on access, quality or equity in education” (p. 29). The definition incorporates those
of the World Bank and Transparency International and also highlights the ramifications of
corruption regarding access, equity, and quality.
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Preventing or combating academic corruption is a strategic issue in the higher education
subsystems. But are there models that provide reliable lenses to the combatants? The question
can be answered in the affirmative. Gary Becker’s (1968) crime–punishment model offers useful
insights into the forces that sustain academic corruption and the strategies from which higher
education institutions and quality assurance systems at institutional, national, and international
levels can borrow to launch an onslaught on academic corruption. The >5-decade-old model,
albeit fit for the current times, postulates that self-interested individuals will engage in corrupt
behavior if the expected gains from corruption outweigh the expected costs (detection and
punishment) associated with corrupt acts. According to this model, the level of corruption that an
individual is motivated to engage in will be higher when the level of personal gain is higher, the
probability of detection is lower, and the penalty is lower. Therefore, the model portrays corruption
as a crime of calculation (Klitgaard, 1988).
The model can be extended to include the opportunity for corruption. Klitgaard (1988)
identified three variables that affect the opportunity for corruption: discretion, monopoly, and
accountability. Thus, corruption = monopoly + discretion – accountability. The greater the level of
discretion an individual is given, the greater his or her window of opportunity to extract personal
gain through theft, bribes, or other corrupt acts. Without accountability, the officials face little or
no risk of punishment for misdeeds and are, therefore, more likely to engage in corrupt behavior
(Gonzales de Asis, 2006).
In terms of corruption containment strategies, the model advocates reducing the number
of transactions over which individuals have discretion, reducing the scope of gain from each
transaction, increasing the probability of detection, and increasing the penalty for corrupt activities
(i.e., ensuring that the deterrents outweigh any expected gains). To contain corruption under this
framework, one has to have a rule-driven institution that includes strong internal controls and
leaves little room for discretion by individuals while increasing their accountability (Boex, MartinexVazques & and Arze, 2007).
Quality assurance connotes “a continuous process of evaluating (assessing, monitoring,
guaranteeing, maintaining, and improving) the quality of a higher education system, institutions
or programmes” (Vlăsceanu, Grünber, & Pârlea, 2007, p. 74). Quality assurance in higher
education serves two purposes: accountability and improvement of education. Accountability is
the raison d’être of external quality assurance, whereas improvement is the purpose of internal
quality assurance.
External Quality Assurance and Corruption
Generally, there are two types of quality assurance in higher education: internal and
external. External quality assurance connotes a form of quality assurance that is performed within
state, national, or international higher education systems by bodies outside the higher education
institutions. It is an extrinsic form of quality assurance in higher education and a post-1980s
phenomenon. Conversely, internal quality assurance is a form of quality assurance that is
exercised by the higher education institutions themselves. National quality assurance frameworks
(e.g., in Uganda) require higher education institutions to establish quality assurance units.
There is no magic formula to fight academic corruption, and external quality assurance is
not a panacea. However, national quality assurance regulatory agencies are uniquely placed to
fight academic corruption preventively (Martin, 2016; Stensaker, 2013). The UNESCO and CHEA
(2016) advisory statement offers guidance to the quality assurance agencies on the possible
preventive actions in the critical areas of the teaching roles of higher education institutions,
student admissions and recruitment, student assessment, credentials and qualifications, and
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research, theses, and publication. The specific approaches that external quality assurance
agencies can use to prevent and/or identify academic corruption can be understood from, inter
alia, the purpose of external quality assurance (accountability), the functions of the quality
assurance agencies, and the methodologies at the disposal of the agencies to assure the quality
of higher education. What follows is an exposition of the mechanisms or approaches that external
quality assurance agencies can use to combat academic corruption in higher education.
Setting Academic Integrity Standards
Higher education institutions are expected, though this is not often realized, to be epitomes
of academic integrity. It is often believed that observance of academic integrity—“values of
honesty, trust, respect, fairness and responsibility” (Heyneman, 2013, p. 103)—is not an endeavor
in futility; it pays dividends in terms of the reputation of the institutions, influences potential
students’ choice of the institutions, and has a bearing on the quality of the graduates. Academic
integrity is intended to ensure that “research, teaching and learning are conducted honestly and
fairly by faculty, staff and students alike” (Bretag, 2013, p. 171)—areas that are prone to academic
dishonesty. In most national higher education systems in sub-Saharan Africa, the
postmassification higher education legislation entrusts national higher education regulatory
bodies with the responsibility of setting standards, including academic integrity standards, and
monitoring their implementation at the level of the academy.
As the discourse on the role of quality assurance agencies in combating academic
corruption gains traction, it is pertinent to reflect on the question: To what extent are integrity
standards integral to the general standards for higher education? This question can only be
answered through conducting further research. However, there is anecdotal evidence to the effect
that academic integrity standards are featured among those in higher education spaces. So, to
what extent can the higher education regulatory bodies capitalize on the standards-setting
function to prevent and/or identify academic corruption? It should be borne in mind that academic
integrity standards are necessary but not sufficient in addressing academic corruption. If the
existence of standards was a panacea for academic corruption, then there would be no cases of
academic dishonesty at the level of the academy. Nevertheless, academic integrity standards can
prevent corruption by “signalling that there are standards and requirements to uphold” (Stensaker,
2013, p. 124).
It is possible for integrity standards to be decoupled from the practices at the institutional
level. It is, therefore, pertinent that national higher education regulatory bodies prevail upon the
institutions to translate academic integrity standards into institutional-level policies and codes of
conduct and disseminate them widely. Just like the national standards, the policies and codes of
conduct would have a signaling effect at the academy level. Standards can comprise certain
preventive measures, such as appeals and complaints measures that the students can resort to
in case of breach of the standards by the internal stakeholders in higher education institutions.
Accreditation of Institutions and Academic Programs
Accreditation, regardless of the form it takes, is a common external quality assurance
practice in higher education. Accreditation refers to “the establishment of the status, legitimacy or
appropriateness of an institution, programme or mode of study” (Stensaker, 2013, p. 125). In
Uganda, accreditation refers to “public acceptance and confirmation evidenced by the grant of a
charter that a University meets the requirements and standards of academic excellence set by
the National Council [for Higher Education]” (Government of Uganda, 2001, p. 1). It is therefore
an affirmation that “a higher education institution or its programmes comply with a set of preestablished standards and criteria” (Martin, 2016, p. 53).
Battling Academic Corruption in Higher Education …
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The objects of accreditation are institutions (and their satellite campuses) and academic
programs. Institutional accreditation can take on a voluntary basis, as is the case with the United
States, and a compulsory basis or a statutory and de jure model. The statutory accreditation
necessitates the accreditation of higher education institutions by the quality assurance agencies.
Conversely, the de jure accreditation variant implies that higher education institutions are
accredited by the law. The de jure accreditation approach is common in sub-Saharan African
countries where the public higher education institutions, save for their study programs and satellite
campuses, are not candidates for accreditation by the quality assurance agencies. The
shortcoming with de jure accreditation of public higher education institutions is that it can
inadvertently occasion institutional complacency and, thus, militate against quality improvement
and adherence to academic integrity standards. In Uganda, issuance of a charter by the Head of
State means that the higher education institution is “accredited and certificates, diplomas, degrees
and other academic awards by the University shall be recognised as of comparable and
equivalent merit with those of other accredited and Public Universities in Uganda” (Government
of Uganda, 2001, Section 103[a]).
Accreditation has the potential to reduce incidents of academic corruption. The extant
literature places considerable faith in accreditation as a necessary, but not sufficient, tool to either
prevent or battle academic corruption. For instance, Stensaker (2013) asserted that “[a]mong the
different mechanisms for QA [quality assurance], accreditation is the most suited to address
corruption” (p. 125). This stance is corroborated by Martin (2016), who opined that accreditation
has the “highest potential to prevent and identify corruption in higher education” (p. 54). The extant
scholarship on the subject leans more toward whether it can combat corruption rather than how
it does it or has done it. On the subject of how accreditation can combat corruption, Martin and
Poisson (2015) opined that “accreditation can have a strong signalling effect for higher education
institutions” (p. 1) and portrays an indirect message that there are standards to be adhered to.
Similarly, Heyneman (2013) suggested that the mechanisms to combat academic corruption
should be built into the accreditation procedures, and these may include the existence of a sound
infrastructure against corruption generally—and academic corruption, in particular. The existence
of a sound ethical integrity structure, policies, and practices should be a precondition for
accreditation of institutions.
As an academic corruption prevention strategy, accreditation of institutions should not be
in perpetuity. There are two approaches to ensuring that accreditation is not infinite: requiring
accreditation renewal after a specified period and providing mechanisms for revoking
accreditation. In the first approach, the academic integrity record of an institution should be
stipulated as a condition for renewal of accreditation. In the second approach, higher education
legislation should provide adequate mechanisms for the revocation of the accreditation in
instances of demonstrable breach of academic integrity standards. The two approaches have
potential to promote institutional adherence to the academic integrity standards.
Accredited higher education institutions may exhibit the tendencies of degree or diploma
mills. In Uganda, the National Council for Higher Education (NCHE) has often queried the capacity
of some higher education institutions to turn out big numbers of doctoral students from a single
intake at a single graduation ceremony. When Kampala International University, whose doctoral
program was accredited in 2009, graduated 66 doctoral students in 2011 and 2012, the Ugandan
quality assurance agency (i.e., NCHE) raised a red flag. An independent assessment of the
doctoral theses, under the oversight of NCHE, revealed that the majority of them lacked
doctorateness. This culminated in placing a moratorium on Kampala International University
regarding admission to a doctoral program and the graduation of doctorates. In 2013, NCHE
investigated Kampala University, another private university, over awarding a degree to Hassan
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Ali Joho—a prominent Kenyan politician—under questionable circumstances. The Quality
Assurance Committee set up by NCHE to probe the Bachelor of Business Administration degree
awarded to the politician recommended withdrawal of the degree. The withdrawal of the degree
by NCHE in 2013 marked the genesis of a protracted court battle between the university and
NCHE. The issue was not whether the politician’s admission was regular or whether he met the
minimum graduation requirements but whether the action of NCHE—investigation of the matter
of irregular admission and graduation of the politician and withdrawal of the qualification)—was
ultra vires (i.e., beyond the express or implied powers conferred by the law). In 2014, the high
court ruled in favor of the university on grounds that NCHE had usurped the powers of the
university senate. The ruling of the court and the action(s) of NCHE resulted in tension between
institutional autonomy and compliance with the minimum national standards and between the
laws and ethics. Whereas the court’s decision met the legal test, it falls short on the ethical
barometer.
Accreditation of Journals
Publication is susceptible to academic corruption. The “either publish or perish” dictum in
higher education escalates pressure on academics to publish regardless of the outlet. Similarly,
the policy requirement by some higher education institutions for doctoral students to publish
articles from their theses has provided fertile opportunities for the mushrooming of predatory
publishers and journals in the higher education landscape. These publishing outlets lack a
rigorous peer-review system and publish works on condition that the author(s) pay a fee rather
than basing on the quality of the works. They therefore compromise the creation and
dissemination of rigorous scientific works.
Quality assurance systems and higher education institutions are now confronted with this
challenge of immense proportions and are devising strategies to contain it. In South Africa, the
Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) accredits journals that are housed in the
country and also publishes a list of indices that are recognized within the South African higher
education space. In addition to the locally accredited journals, DHET recognizes the following
indices as accredited journals by the DHET: International Bibliography of Social Sciences, the
Science Citation Index, the Social Science Citation Index, the Arts and Humanities Citation Index,
the Norwegian List, Scopus, and the Scientific Electronic Library Online South Africa.
This practice of accrediting journals reflects an extension of accreditation from institutions
(and their satellite campuses) and programs to the research (and publication) mission of higher
education institutions. Similarly, on an annual basis, the DHET publishes a list of recognized
journals within the South African higher education space. A person ought to have published in a
journal that is recognized by DHET to be eligible for a subsidy or to receive recognition for the
research output. This, in effect, means that an article in a predatory journal is inadmissible in the
national and institutional rewards systems, including promotion. In some higher education
systems, national quality assurance agencies publish lists of predatory journals and caution
researchers against publishing their works in such journals. Generally, these practices have the
potential to promote academic integrity at higher education institutions because, in addition to
contributing to knowledge, promotion, rewards, and recognition are among the reasons why
academics publish. Therefore, quality assurance agencies should consider adopting accreditation
of journals as a quality assurance strategy in the domain of research and publication.
Accreditation of journals has the potential to dissuade researchers from publishing in
predatory or fake journals. Just like accredited higher education institutions that may exhibit
characteristics of degree mills, accredited journals exhibit the characteristics of predatory journals.
Battling Academic Corruption in Higher Education …
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Therefore, the regulatory bodies for higher education should ensure that the indexing and
accreditation of journals are not in perpetuity. Basing accreditation on adherence to the tenets of
a rigorous peer review system is likely to predispose institutions to the maintenance of academic
integrity in publication.
Sharing Information and Promoting Whistleblowing
It is often argued that information is power. In this respect, the quality assurance agencies
can capitalize on the power of information to fight academic corruption through empowering the
stakeholders with information on, among others, the fake institutions and providing lists of
accredited institutions and the respective accredited programs, admission requirements to
various programs, the graduation requirements, lists of predatory journals, and the quality
standards. Publication of information serves two purposes: It creates a disincentive for potential
students to enroll at the institutions and to publish in the predatory journals and it provides
information for whistleblowing in case of breach of the standards. Information sharing should go
hand in hand with strengthening whistleblowing mechanisms that provide information about
corrupt practices at institutional level.
Monitoring of Institutions
One of the ways in which external quality assurance agencies can take a leading role in
tackling academic corruption is through monitoring the institutions of higher learning. However,
this is constrained by the inadequate human, material, and fiscal resources. Generally, monitoring
increases the chances of detection of instances of academic corruption. The chances for actors
at the institutional level to engage in unethical conduct are higher if the chances of detection are
lower. The monitoring function should be guided by context-specific anticorruption checklists. For
monitoring to be effective, it should be regular and also have a surprise element.
Building Integrity Indicators Into Recruitment and Selection Processes
In higher education systems in transitional economies, the recruitment and selection
processes for most leaders at the steering core and academic heartland are based on research
excellence and the years of working experience. The integrity indicators usually take a back seat
in the process. The leaders who score low on the integrity indicators are more predisposed to
honor the general standards in higher education and, particularly, the academic integrity
standards in breach rather than in practice. Therefore, there is a need to strengthen the
gatekeeping function of who becomes a leader at the steering core and academic heartland in
higher education institutions, without compromising the principle of institutional autonomy. This,
in essence, suggests that integrity indicators should be built into the recruitment and selection
process of senior managers of higher education institutions.
Sanctions
The operant conditioning theorists opine that behavior that receives negative
consequences (punishments or sanctions) is likely to disappear on the part of the deviant actor
and serves as a deterrent to others who may contemplate engaging in similar (mis)conduct. In
higher education, academic integrity standards constitute best practices whose breach should,
after due process, attract punitive measures such as revocation of accreditation and licenses. In
Uganda, the quality assurance agency has been employing sanctions on higher education
institutions over breach of academic integrity standards. In 2017, NCHE revoked the provisional
license of Busoga University owing to unending irregularities such as admission of students
without the requisite admission criteria, teaching unaccredited programs, and irregular graduation
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of students who did not qualify. The university exhibited the tendencies of a degree mill when,
within 2 months of study at a cost $1,000 per student, awarded degrees to over 1,000 South
Sudanese and Nigerian nationals. This is a manifestation of the cost of the academic dishonesty
outweighing the benefits in terms of a few dollars from the foreign students. The closure of
institutions sends a strong message to higher education institutions that their provisional licenses
or charters are on the line in the event of nonadherence to academic integrity standards, in
particular, and the standards applicable to higher education, in general. In the current discourse
in Uganda, there are voices that believe that managers of institutions that honor academic
integrity standards in breach rather than in practice should be held accountable for academic
dishonesty through prosecution. This school of thought is based on two premises. First, fear of
personal prosecution or sanctions would create a disincentive from engaging in academic
impropriety. Second, it is not the higher education institutions but the behavior of the managers
that leads to the closure of the institutions, and hence, the deviant behavior should attract
consequences at the individual level.
Ranking Institutions Based on Integrity Indicators and Publishing the Rankings
Generally, the global ranking schemes in higher education are inclined toward prestige
and status building (Oyewole, 2010). Higher education institutions are doing whatever it takes to
improve their ranking in the various global ranking schemes. A ranking methodology or scheme
that principally focuses on academic integrity indicators ought to be explored by quality assurance
agencies in national higher education systems. Such ranking schemes can act as an incentive for
higher education institutions to improve their academic integrity standing. Poor ranking on the
integrity front can occasion enormous reputational damage to institutions and act as a disincentive
for students to enroll at the institutions. Similarly, competition among the institutions to be at in
the top league is likely to motivate institutions to work toward zero-tolerance for academic
dishonesty. Finally, the higher education institutions that perform dismally on the academic
integrity index would be compelled to repair the reputational damage through enhancing
adherence to the academic integrity standards.
Conclusion
Academic corruption is a wicked problem in higher education. What is often reported in
the media and in the numerous investigation reports appears to be on the tip of the iceberg. The
burgeoning incidents of academic corruption and the faith in quality higher education as a tool
with unequalled potential to promote economic growth and development provide a compelling
justification for launching an onslaught on academic corruption. From the stance of the article, the
question of whether external quality assurance provides a ray of hope for combating academic
corruption can be answered in the affirmative. The efficacy of external quality assurance in
curbing academic corruption can be enhanced by skewing it to the accountability imperative.
While the prescriptions in this article should not be treated as a blueprint and, therefore, fit for all
contexts, they nevertheless provide insights into the approaches that higher education quality
assurance agencies could adapt to their contexts. We take cognizance of the fact that the article
is not grounded in empirical data, especially on how the suggested practices have impinged on
academic corruption in higher education institutions. However, this gap does not diminish the
value of the article in the anticorruption discourse. In view of the limitation of the article that has
been highlighted here, we recommend studies that are grounded in empirical data and that
answer the question of whether and how quality assurance at the upstream has affected
incidences of academic corruption in higher education institutions and systems.
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